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DEMOCRATIC
TRANSITIONS
IN AFRICA
Shaheen Mozaffar

D

emocracy in Africa! The very idea
sounds like a cruel oxymoron. Terrible pictures of seemingly endless
civil wars in impoverished countries, of
starving children in squalid refugee camps,
and of the human brutality of ethnic genocide have typically filled the all-too-erratic
American media reports on Africa in recent
years. These pictures represent very real
human suffering and tragedy, but they also
tell unduly exaggerated and only partial stories that evoke horrifying images of widespread social, economic and political degradation of an otherwise complex and diverse region of the African continent. These
images distort our perceptions and reinforce
unspoken stereotypes of the 560 million
people living in 48 countries. Beyond these
horrifying images, however, and largely unnoticed by the American media, a dramatic
political transformation has been underway
in sub-Saharan Africa since 1989, and in
some countries, even before that. The central feature of this transformation is the yet
unfinished process of democratic transition.
The Historical Context of
Democratic Transitions in Africa
The unfolding process of democratic
transition in Africa is part of what Harvard
political scientist Samuel P. Huntington has
termed the "third wave" of democratization
in the modem world. In the first wave between 1828-1926, modem democracy expanded from its intellectual roots in the
American and the French Revolutions to
Western Europe and parts of Latin America,
before being reversed by the rise of fascism
in Italy and Germany. The second wave between 1942-62 witnessed the advent of democracy in Germany, Italy and Japan, in
most of Latin America, and in the Asian and
African countries gaining independence
from European colonial rule. The years

L

1962-1973 witnessed a reversal of the second wave as authoritarian governments replaced most of the fledgling democracies in
Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The third
wave began on April 25, 1974, with the overthrow of Portugal's 48-year old authoritarian government in a peaceful military coup
and the installation a year later of one of
the world's most successful democracies.
From this ironic beginning, the third wave
spread rapidly to Spain and Greece, across
the Atlantic to Latin America, and then to
Asia. In 1989, as communism and the Berlin Wall fell, it engulfed Eastern Europe, Russia and most of the former Soviet Republics, and simultaneously swept across Africa.
In the aftermath of the Cold War, the
third wave fostered a supportive international environment for the incipient but uneven movements toward democracy in Africa. Democracy has always been an integral, albeit a problematic, component ofAfrican political development for over three
decades. Most African countries gained independence in the 1960s with democratic
governments elected in the waning days of
European colonial rule. While most ofthem
subsequently turned toward authoritarian
rule, Botswana and Mauritius remained, and
continue to remain, uninterrupted democracies. Gambia's 27 year-old democracy was
overthrown by a military coup in 1994, but
the country elected a new democratic government a year later. In the 1970s, Burkina
Faso, Ghana, Liberia, Madagascar, Nigeria,
Sierra Leone and Sudan elected short-lived
democratic governments. More controversially, apartheid South Africa and Northern
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) held regular
competitive elections, but with franchise restricted to the minority European population. Even in some single-party regimes,
notably in Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, Malawi,
Senegal, and Zambia, tightly-controlled candidate nominations and electoral competition among aspiring local candidates served
as important mechanisms for pork-barrel
servicing of local communities with valuable national resources, for recruiting new
leaders with strong local ties, and for legitimizing authoritarian governments.
The 1980s witnessed intermittent but
discernible movements toward democracy
on the continent. In Zimbabwe (1980) and
Namibia (1989), negotiated settlements to
protracted civil wars facilitated the establishment of democratic governments
through multiparty elections. In 1983,
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Senegal elected its first government through
multiparty elections after 20 years of singleparty rule. At the time, it had one ofAfrica's
most stable authoritarian regimes and also
one of the continent's most successful
economies. Its tum toward democracy was
symptomatic of the growing pressure on African authoritarian rulers for political and
economic liberalization. The source of this
pressure was the severe economic crises
caused by the combination of a global recession in the early 1980s and misguided
domestic policies of market controls, trade
restrictions, deficit spending, and inflated
currencies. African authoritarian rulers responded to these pressures with a combination of political concessions aimed at assuaging the most politically important segments of the society and political repression
aimed at controlling the pace and extent of
liberalization. Thus, the Nigerian military
rulers aborted their self-proclaimed plans for
democratic transition by imprisoning the
business tycoon who had defeated their
hand-picked candidate in the freest and the
fairest elections ever held in the country.
In Ghana, on the other hand, the military
government, forced to implement harsh
structural adjustment policies as a condition for receiving Western financial aid,
promised and eventually held non-partisan
local elections in 1988 that presaged a successful transition to full democracy four
years later. Elsewhere, for example in Kenya,
Tanzania, Zaire, and Zambia, authoritarian
incumbents used co-optation, exile and imprisonment to silence the weak and fragmented pro-democracy forces until concerted international and domestic pressures
sparked by the third wave compelled them
democratize.
Indicators of Democratic
Transitions in Africa
As in Latin America and Eastern Europe, democratic transitions in Africa did
not always produce the desired democratic
outcomes, due to a combination of politically astute authoritarian rulers and politically inept pro-democracy forces. Even so,
the impact of the third wave on the continent was, by all measures, dramatic. First,
it unleashed a wave of mass, often violent,
protests (86 in 1991 alone) that directly precipitated political liberalization in 28 countries and indirectly launched preemptive
political liberalization in 10 others. In most
cases, political liberalization reformed au-
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thoritarian regimes with the introduction
large numbers of candidates will enter the
governmental powers and responsibilities
of explicit constitutional guarantees of fununtested waters of electoral competition.
are crafted. African political actors, infludamental civil liberties and political rights.
This conclusion is validated by the fact that
enced by strong international norms, have
Second, these initial political openings
an average of 5 candidates ran for the top
generally agreed on the basic provisions of
sparked an unprecedented efflorescence of
office in the 29 founding elections.
constitutional guarantees of civil liberties
civic associations, private media
and political rights. However,
outlets (mostly print and radio),
they have differed sharply on
u. s. S. R.
unfettered political debate, and
the rules of electoral competiNo rth
vigorous criticisms of governAt 1ant i c
tion and restraints on governOcean
ments. Third, and more signifimental power, because these
JPo.. ,
cantly, political liberalization led
rules determine opportunities
to competitive legislative elecfor political representation, for
tions in all 38 countries, with opshaping public policies, and for
position parties winning seats in
affecting the resulting distribunational legislatures for the first
tion of burdens and benefits in
time since independence in 35.
society. It is, therefore, useful
In addition, 29 countries held
to think of liberalization and
v
"founding elections" in which r .",.
democratization as separate
the chief executive was directly
processes, even though they
elected by the people in a comare interrelated in practice.
petitive election. Finally, these
Liberalization is necesfounding elections produced
sary for democratization, but
peaceful leadership turnover for
may not automatically lead to
the first time since indepenit. It can produce political
dence, as 13 former authoritarSo\j~~~
chaos, as, for example, in
,..
Rwanda and Zaire. It can enian incumbents who ran for elecSou t h
tion were defeated, while 15 were
gender a prolonged period of
A t I ant i c
re-elected. In a novel political
uncertainty, especially when
o cean
development for Africa, former
authoritarian rulers (usually
authoritarian rulers who were
the military) feel threatened by
defeated in the founding electhe pace and extent of political
tions were returned to office in
liberalization and block further
In d ian
reform, as, for example, in Nithe second round of democratic
Ocean
elections in Benin and Madagasgeria and Togo. It can produce
car.
fragile democracies susceptible
ldooM'les
Measures of levels of politito military coups, as, for excal participation and electoral
ample, in Niger. It can lead to
competition in founding elecflawed democratization in
The Politics of Democratic
tions also confirm the dramatic nature of
which authoritarian incumbents with sufficient political leverage against fragmented
Transitions in Mrica
Mrica's third wave democratic transitions.
pro-democracy forces successfully manipuThese quantitative indicators of the
Measuring the level of political participation
by voter turnout as percentage of registered
wide scope ofAfrica's third wave democratic
late democratic elections in their favor, as,
voters indicates an overall average turnout
transitions challenge conventional wisdom
for example, in Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire,
of 64 percent across the 29 countries holdGabon, and Kenya.
about the economic and cultural pre-coning founding elections. This figure is not
ditions for the origin of modern democraMost importantly, thinking about libhigh by global standards, but is impressive
cies. They point instead to a political logic.
eralization and democratization as separate
An understanding of this logic requires clarinevertheless, especially ifwe recall that most
processes helps us to recognize the comfying the meaning of democratic transition.
of these countries were governed for over
plexity of democratic transitions and the unA democratic transition consists of two
two decades by authoritarian regimes which
certainty of transition outcomes. Demoeither proscribed or tightly controlled poclosely related processes: (1) a process of
cratic transitions are complex processes
liberalization in which constitutional guarlitical participation. Measuring electoral
because they require the simultaneous deantees of civil liberties and political rights
competition by the winner's share of votes
struction of an existing authoritarian regime
and limits on the exercise of power by the
as a percentage of total votes cast indicates
and the construction of a new democratic
an average winner's share of 63 percent for
government and the people replace personal
order. Democratic transitions are successful to the extent that these two contradicthe 29 countries holding founding elections.
and arbitrary rule as the basic institutional
tory imperatives are adequately managed,
This equally impressive figure indicates that,
framework of governance; and (2) a process
of democratization in which rules regulateven if not entirely resolved. Democratic
after an extended period of authoritarian
ing electoral competition and specifying
transitions outcomes are always uncertain
rule with limited political opportunities,
.... Azores
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because the construction of a new democratic order requires crafting new rules of
governance whose potential costs and benefits reside obscurely in the future. Since
authoritarian incumbents and pro-democracy elites who craft democracies can only
anticipate without fully knowing these future costs and benefits, they will prefer rules
that will favor their particular interests in
the new democratic order. With their current power relations defining their conflicting interests, they struggle to design the
rules of the new democratic order. This
struggle animates the politics of democratic
transitions. All new democracies, whether
in the first, second or third wave, thus
emerge as improvised, negotiated and often unintended second-best solutions to
this quintessential political struggle.
The nature of this struggle and the
types of democracies emerging from it in
Mrica today is best illustrated by examining
the politics surrounding the choice of electoral systems. The choice of an electoral
system-the sets of rules that regulate competitive elections and determine their outcomes-is one of the most important political decisions made in emerging democracies, because competitive elections are the
principal-but not the only-institutional
means for securing political representation
and access to valued state resources in all
modern democracies. Particularly critical
in new democracies is the choice of an electoral formula for translating votes into seats.
Plurality (or majority) formulas, traditionally used in Britain and the United States
(and France), require political parties to win
a relative (or absolute) majority of votes in
order to win legislative seats, and usually
discriminate against smaller parties. Proportional representation (PR) formulas,
widely used in Western Europe, allocate legislative seats in proportion to the votes won
by political parties, and usually favor smaller
parties.
The two formulas embody different visions of democratic politics that define different types of democracy. Plurality formulas embody a majoritarian vision of democratic politics that clearly defines the locus
of political authority and accountability,
whereby incumbent and opposition parties
present voters with clear policy choices, voters elect the party closest to their policy preferences, and the winning party governs until the next election. PR formulas embody
a consensus vision of democratic politics

Table 1. The Political Dynamics of Bectoral Systems
Choice in Africa's Third Wave Democratic Transitions
Balance 01
Polilical Power
Favorable to
Authoritarian
Incumbents
(or to Small
Numbers of
Large Groups)

Plurality
Proportional
(Majorily)
Represenlation
Electoral Systems Electoral Systems
Cameroon
Central Africa Rep.
Comoros
Congo
Cote d'ivoire
Gabon
Gambia (1996)
Ghana
Kenya
Lesotho
Tanzania.
Togo
Zimbabwe (1985)
Zambia

Favorable to
Pro-Democracy
Forces

Benin
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cape Verde
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Madagascar
Niger
Sao Tome &
Principe

Equally Divided
Between Incumbents
and Opponents
Engaged in Civil War

Angola
Liberia
Mozambique
Namibia
Sierra Leone
South Africa
Zimbabwe (1980)

Table 1

that contains a more inclusive definition of
democratic governance, whereby a variety
of parties present socially diverse voters a
wide range of policy choices, parties and
voters are proportionally represented, and
a coalition government is formed by bargaining among winning parties, virtually all
or most ofwhich are represented at one time
or another in shifting governing coalitions.
In Mrica's third wave democratic transitions, the choice of electoral systems with
corresponding visions of democratic politics reflects the outcome of three distinct
political dynamics, each distinguished by
the relative balance of political power between authoritarian incumbents and the
pro-democracy forces (see Table 1). First,
plurality (or majority) electoral systems were
generally chosen in those countries in
which the balance of political power favored
the authoritarian incumbents. They were
also chosen in a small number of countries
in which the authoritarian rulers departed
before the onset of democratization, and the
politics animating the choice of electoral
systems was dominated by a small number
of large pro-democracy groups either with
9
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a national support base (e.g. Mali) or a regionally-concentrated support base (e.g.
Malawi). In all these countries, the relative
power balance enabled the favored groups
to virtually dictate the choice of new electoral systems, with their known support
base and local dominance offering protection against opposition in competitive elections.
Second, PR electoral systems were chosen in countries in which the balance of political power favored the pro-democracy
forces, because of the following political
logic. In all these countries, pro-democracy
forces were multiparty coalitions with the
potential of splitting during and after the
elections. On the one hand, therefore, opposition leaders wished to reinforce future
electoral opportunities for themselves as a
block vis-a-vis the authoritarian incumbents. On the other, they wished to protect
future opportunities for their individual parties that provisionally comprised the present
coalition against the authoritarian incumbents. The choice of PR systems was a strategically rational response to these twin politicallogics.
Finally, PR electoral systems were chosen in deeply-divided countries which experienced recent civil wars or near-civil war
conditions (e.g. South Mrica). In all these
countries, protracted violent conflicts eventually produced what political scientist and
negotiation expert I. William Zartman has
characterized as a situation of "mutually
hurting stalemate." This is a situation beyond which further conflict is recognized
by all combatants to be mutually destructive. In the ensuing negotiated settlements
to these conflicts, the choice of PR electoral
systems offered the most strategically rational option to protect the future political interests of all parties in the new democratic
order.
The South Mrican solution, of course,
attracted the most press coverage in the
United States, but that coverage failed to
report that the fatally flawed apartheid system and its debilitating legacies prevented
both Nelson Mandela and De Klerk initially
from accepting and articulating a consensus vision of democratic politics. Neither
leader, as a result, preferred a PR electoral
system as his first choice. The PR system
that guided South Mrica's historic democratic transition was adopted after two years
of vigorous national debate and intense political negotiations. In the other six coun-

----------------tries listed in Table 1 under this pattern of
electoral systems choice, there never was
any discussion of plurality (or majority) systems, even though Liberia and Sierra Leone
had employed plurality systems in their
failed experiments with democracy in the
1970s, and Zimbabwe eventually returned
to a plurality system in 1985. In negotiating democratic transitions as settlements
to protracted conflicts, the choice of PR systems represents a critical confidence-building strategy aimed at encouraging violent
political enemies to become peaceful political adversaries. That such systems are chosen in countries which have no previous experience with them suggest, more broadly,
that democracies are neither historically determined nor culturally prescribed, but are
crafted by strategically rational actors tempered by political calculations in changing
contexts.
The Prospects for Sustaining
Democracy in Africa
What are the prospects for sustaining
Africa's third wave democracies? Definitive
answers would be premature, since not
enough time has elapsed to accumulate systematic data on the performance of these
democracies. Several possibilities suggest
themselves, however. First, the prospects
for sustaining new democracies in Africa are
likely to increase with the ability of new
democratic institutions to manage political
conflicts peacefully. Political conflicts are
the inevitable concomitants of routine decisions about the allocation of scarce societal resources, and the distinguishing hallmark of all democracies is the provision of
institutional opportunities for their organized expression and peaceful management
(contra authoritarian regimes, which deal
with political conflicts by attempting to
eliminate them altogether). Particularly
important are provisions for power-sharing
among major political groups. Such provisions were instrumental in the success of
South Africa's democratic transition, among
others; their absence or ambiguous language contributed to the failure of democratic transition in Angola and the brutal
tragedy in Rwanda. In the absence of formal provisions, informal power-sharing
strategies can also be pursued. For example,
in Guinea, Malawi, and Senegal, among others, political parties winning the transitional
elections have invited the leaders of major
losing parties to join national coalition gov-
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ernments as a means of legitimizing the
new democratic order.
Second, and related to the first, the new
democratic institutions must provide for adequate opportunities for both present and
'future political representation. A crucial
weakness of African authoritarian regimes
was their arbitrary exclusion and inclusion
of targeted groups from political power,
which increased unpredictability, aggravated fears of permanent exclusion (or
worse), and destroyed any prospects of securing 10ng-terl11 allegiance to the regimes.
To the extent that democratic sustainability
requires a long-term horizon, political actors require incentives to play by the rules,
especially when they lose. One key source
of this incentive is the recognition that
today's loser will have the opportunity to
become tomorrow's winners. The institutional design of electoral systems is especially important in this respect. Thus, PR
formulas have fostered political inclusiveness in such deeply-divided societies as
Benin, Namibia, and Sierra Leone. However, plurality systems have also produced
similar outcomes when voters (usually from
the same ethnic group) are regionally concentrated and vote as a block, as, for example, in Malawi.
Third, improved prospects for democratic sustainability require institutional
flexibility. Once crafted, institutions (sets
of rules) tend to stick, promoting peace and
stability. But they are unlikely to do so effectively if they foster socially undesirable
outcomes. Institutional reform is then best
achieved when rules are new and political
actors are just beginning to learn their costs
and benefits. As the experience of several
East European third wave democracies
show, reform of newly-introduced electoral
systems is particularly instrumental in stabilizing otherwise fragile democracies. The
survival ofAfrica's fragile third wave democracies will also depend on their ability to
address this dilemma. Countries such as
Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali have already
successfully reformed their new electoral
systems via an inclusive process of political
negotiations involving government, opposition, and key civil society actors. Similar
debates are underway in Kenya, where the
present plurality system heavily favors the
incumbent, and in Namibia and South Mrica, where the present PR systems, despite
their initial success, give too much power
to political party leaders over the rank-and10

file members in selecting political candidates.
Fourth, widely accepted rules, even
when they have undesirable consequences,
promote political stability, and political stability is an essential condition for economic
development. Even as they have challenged
the conventional wisdom that economic
growth is necessary for democratic transition, the experiences of third wave democracies in Latin America and Southern and
Eastern Europe suggest that economic
growth is necessary for the survival of new
democracies after they are born and that political stability grounded in widely-accepted
rules of the game is a strong foundation for
economic growth. Perhaps more crucially,
even when such growth has occurred
through harsh and unpopular structural adjustment policies that have lowered living
standards, the recognized fairness of democratic rules have substituted as much-need
"political capital" for the survival of democratic governments in otherwise fledgling
third wave democracies. Whether Africa's
fledgling third wave democracies have developed such political capital, or are likely
to do so in the future, is unclear. But, as
the well-known West African proverb says:
"No condition is permanent!"
~

Shaheen Mozaffar is Associate Professor of
Political Science and Research Fellow of the
Boston University African Studies Center.

